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Abstract
This paper empirically examines the influence of political partisanship on antidumping
protection, which has become the most frequently used contingent trade remedy in the last 20
years. First, we show that the number of antidumping initiations from the labor intensive
industries increases when there is a left-wing government in power. In addition, the evidence
on the governments’ decision to impose antidumping duty demonstrates that the increase in
the leftist orientation of the governments is associated with an increase in the likelihood of an
affirmative antidumping outcome from the petitions of labor intensive industries. Although
antidumping is an administrative protection which includes a set of necessary procedures and
rules to follow, our findings clearly points out the political bias in AD actions in the form of
partisan preferences.
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1. Introduction
To date, the role of political ideology in the choice of economic policy
instruments has received serious attention. Many of the existing studies suggest that in
a democratic regime, political parties which compete for electoral votes try to adopt
policies in favor of their electoral base. Hence, it is the constituents’ interests which
determine the ideological attitude of the governments. Generally, the political party
that is in the left ideological spectrum represents workers, whereas the right-wing
represents capital owners.3
Trade policy is one of the policy instruments, which enables a political party to
differentiate itself from others to compete for votes. The redistributive consequence of
the trade policy

is

the pivotal argument

of

the

political

economists

who

have emphasized the partisan-based trade policy. For instance, Milner and Judkins
(2004) investigate the relationship between “class cleavage based partisanship” and
“trade policy” of a political party and find that left-wing parties in advanced
industrial countries adopt more protectionist policies compared to the right-wing
parties. Focusing on US trade policy between 1877 and 1934, Epstein and O.Halloran
(1996) showed that Republicans raised the tariffs, while Democrats cut them.
Rogowski (1989, pp. 98) predicts that in countries, such as United States,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which are capital rich, left-wing parties should
be protectionist. By combining the political support function of Hillman (1989) with
Stoper-Samuelson theorem, Dutt and Mitra (2005), henceforth (DM), show that leftwing governments are protectionist in capital abundant countries, whereas they are

3

See Hibbs (1977), Alesina(1987), Hibbs, Rivers and Vasilatos (1982), Pinto and Pinto (2008)
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pro-trade

in

labor

wing counterparts.
of partisan preferences

abundant
Further,
on

the

countries
Krever

when
(2008)

compared
highlights

to their rightthe impact

government’s decision to form preferential

trade

agreements. His results indicate that independent of its factor endowments, a
country is more likely to form preferential trade agreements when there is a rightwing government in power.
Whether the political ideology of the governments affect the trade policy in the
countries has been widely examined, but nothing is known about the effect of partisan
preferences on antidumping, the most implemented non-tariff barrier over the years.
In this paper, we exploit the three-digit ISIC industries’ trade and production data to
analyze the effect of political ideology on antidumping filings and the governments’
decision to impose AD duty. In this regard, this study represents the first attempt to
integrate antidumping in a study of partisan trade policy.
Limited to developed countries until the late 1980s, the use of AD has
increased worldwide over the past decade especially after the sharp tariff cuts
countries experienced with World Trade Organization’s inception in 1995. According
to Bown (2008), more than 40 members of the World Trade Organization have
become active users of AD. Aggarwal (2007, pp.151, 152) notes three possible
perspectives for the rationale behind the proliferation of AD: the political perspective,
the political economy perspective, and the economic perspective. The first two argues
that AD is a GATT/WTO legal trade remedy used to provide protection to the domestic
firms which is injured by the imports of their foreign competitors. On the other hand,
the last one argues that AD is a policy which aims to prevent a situation where
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international price discrimination drives the domestic firms out of the market. In this
study, we build on the “political economy perspective” to antidumping and seek
evidence as to whether the political ideology of the government has an effect on AD
usage and our empirical results suggest such an effect.
The theoretical perspective of our study is motivated by the earlier work of DM
(2005). Simply put, Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts that trade will increase the
demand for the abundant factor in production and decrease for the scarce one.
Therefore, in a capital intensive industry, it is the owners of labor who suffer, while
capital owners gain from a shift towards protection. On the contrary, increased trade
will benefit capital and hurt labor in labor intensive industries. DM (2005) argues
that since importable good is the labor intensive one in a capital-rich country, an
increase in the leftist orientation of the government increases the trade barriers in
capital abundant countries, and an opposite scenario holds for the labor abundant
countries. This hypothesis is strongly supported in DM (2005) with different types of
protection tools such as tariffs, import duties and quotas.
Following the same line of argument with DM (2005), if the left-wing
government is in power, we would expect an increase in the likelihood of a successful
AD case from the labor intensive industries given the fact that such a government will
be more willing to increase the return to labor. Moreover, we hypothesize that labor
intensive industries believe that the leftist government favors them and thus they are
more likely to file an AD petition in the periods of left-wing governments. These two
hypotheses are strongly supported in our empirical analysis when we employ the
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detailed AD data matched with the three-digit ISIC industries’ trade and production
data.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the
econometric approach and the specifications carried out in our analysis. In Section 3,
we briefly discuss the construction of the data. Section 4 presents the estimation
results, and section 5 provides the concluding remarks.

2. Econometric Methodology
Estimation of Antidumping Initiations
Antidumping is defined under the Article VI of the GATT. In order to receive
protection in the form of an AD duty, domestic firms file an investigation and show
evidence that exporting firms charge lower than the "fair price" they normally charge
in their home market. In addition to this, they document that the domestic industry is
"materially injured" by this price discrimination. Thereafter, national AD agencies
evaluate the investigations and either they impose a duty to the particular productcountry combination or they terminate the case without protection.
In order to examine the effect of partisanship on AD activity, we start with the
following baseline model:
( )

(1)
where
⁄

denotes the total number of AD petitions filed by industry h in country i.
is the capital-labor ratio of the three-digit ISIC industry,
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denotes

the degree of the government’s leftist bias which is quantified as 1 for the right-wing
ideology, 2 for the centrist ideology and 3 for the left-wing ideology.

and

are

vectors of control variables.4 A positive coefficient on the ideology variable and a
negative coefficient in the interaction term would suggest that labor intensive
industries believe that left-wing governments favor them and thus they are more
likely to file an AD investigation given the higher expected belief they have for a
successful outcome.
Since the dependent variable is count data with excess zeros, we employ Zero
Inflated Poisson (ZIP) method suggested in Lambert (1992) and Greene (2004).5 ZIP
models the likelihood of an industry to ﬁle antidumping investigation in two stages. In
the ﬁrst one, domestics firms will never ﬁle an antidumping investigation. For
instance, if an industry believes that the benefit of a successful case might not be
sufficient enough to dominate the costs associated with filing an investigation because
of their low share in total imports; it may never choose to claim dumping. In the
second stage, the industry may or may not ﬁle an AD investigation based on the
industry and country related factors.6,7
We also control for various other factors following the AD literature. For
instance, in line with the WTO rules stated above, we include the average output and
import growth of the industry in the last three years. The likelihood of filing an AD
petition should increase with the fall in production and with more competition from
4

We use the natural logs of capital-labor ratios as in Dutt and Mitra (2005). Besides, this variable is
lagged one period in all specifications of our empirical analysis to avoid the potential endogeneity.
5
The dependent variable is zero for the 80% of the total observations.
6
For the same argument and the application of ZIPM in antidumping literature, see Reynolds (2006).
7
To identify the first stage we used our industry and country controls.
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imports. We believe that industries with higher output have more ability to file an AD
petition due to the fact that it is easier for them to cover the fixed costs associated with
filing and follow the necessary process of an AD investigation. Consequently, we
control for the share of industry output in a country’s total GDP to capture the
lobbying and the financial power of that particular industry.
Following the argument in Francois and Niels (2006) and Knetter and Prusa
(2003), we are more likely to find an AD petition in periods of exchange rate
appreciation, current account deficits and economic recession. In this regard, we
include the growth rate of GDP, exchange rate and current account balance. In
addition, as noted in Bown (2008), 1995 inception of WTO resulted in a common set
of rules which are binding for all members of WTO. Therefore, we included a dummy
variable to control for the WTO membership. Finally, we also control for the
democracy level in the countries given the fact that policy makers in democratic
regime are more prone to pursue policies in favor of their electoral base.

Estimation of Antidumping Outcomes
We now turn our focus to the AD duty imposition decisions of AD authorities.
As noted earlier, having reviewed the filings, AD authorities impose extra duties on
the particular good in order to bring the value of the good closer to its fair value if
there is dumping and injury to the domestic market.
In order to quantify the effect of government’s ideology on the affirmative AD
outcome, we carry out case-level estimation. We estimate the following linear
probability model:
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(2)

where the binary dependent variable is 1 if government authorities decide
affirmatively to a specific AD case from industry h and zero otherwise. Our hypothesis
is that left-wing governments, which tend to increase the returns to labor, are more
likely to decide affirmatively for AD cases of the industries that are more labor
intensive. Therefore, the predicted signs of the ideology variable and the interaction
term are positive and negative respectively. We also include the same set of control
variables in equation (1).

3. Data
We collected the data of output, import, gross fixed capital formation, number
of workers, number of establishments and the tariff data of 28 three-digit ISIC
industries from World Bank Trade, Production and Protection (TPP) database (Nicita
and Olerreaga, 2006. Following the convention, the capital stocks ( ) of industries
are calculated from investment series by the perpetual inventory equation:
(13)
where

is the gross fixed capital formation and

capital stock (

) is computed as

is the depreciation rate.8 The initial

, where

growth rate for the first ten years of available data. 9

8
9

The depreciation rate is assumed to be 0.06.
See Caselli (2004).
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is the average geometric

The data on product-level AD investigations and outcomes are obtained from

Global Antidumping Database Version 5.0 (Bown, 2009) which provides detailed
product-level information on AD filings and outcomes. This database provides the
date of the initiation and final decision of AD case, the target country, the final
decision of the AD authority as well as the HS codes of the products subject to filings.
For the industry codes we used the concordances in the TPP database.
For the political ideology variable, we utilize the Database of Political

Institutions (Beck et al., 2008), which is updated annually and includes data for the
period 1975 through 2006. This database provides qualitative information on the
political position of the executive power for each country, in the form of leftist,
centrist and rightist ideologies. Our continuous ideology variable, whose increase can
be interpreted as an increase in the leftist orientation, takes on a value of 1, 2 and 3
for the right-wing, centrist and left-wing governments respectively.10
For the democracy index, we use Freedom in the World Country Ratings,
Freedom House’s publication which was published in 1972 and reports the data on
civil liberties and political rights for 193 countries. The democracy (political rights)
index is such that more democratic countries are assigned a lower score than less
democratic countries on a scale of 1 to 7. We reversed the scores by subtracting each
score from 8 so that more democratic countries take higher scores.
The data on WTO membership comes from WTO website and the data on tariff
of six-digit Harmonized System products are obtained from UNCTAD’s TRAINS
10

While we do not report in the paper, we also tried assigning a dummy variable for each ideology
category and running the regressions with that measure in order to test for the robustness of the
results. Our findings are insensitive to different treatment of the ideology measure.
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database. Finally, we use the database of United States Department of Agriculture

(USDA) Economic Research Service for the data of exchange rate and World
Development Indicators for the data of GDP growth and the current account.
Table 1 and Table 2 provide the descriptive statistics and Table A1 documents
the countries in the sample and their overall AD activity. 11,12

4. Results
Table 3 reports the estimates of the zero inflated Poisson model in equation (1).
As documented, the positive coefficient of the ideology variable and the negative
coefficient of the interaction term support the prediction that the number of AD
investigations increases for labor intensive industries when the government’s leftist
orientation increases. The rationale behind this finding is that such industries believe
that left-wing governments favor them and thus their expected probability of winning
a case is higher in the periods with leftist governments.
In terms of control variables, we observe more AD filings from the industries
with higher output share in accordance with the lobbying and financial power
argument. In addition, with respect to the WTO requirements, an increase in industry
output is associated with a decrease in the number of AD initiations, and the opposite
result is observed with an increase in growth of the industry imports. Moreover,
consistent with the previous studies in AD literature, appreciation of the local
11

The availability of the investment and labor data in TPP determines the sample of our analysis
The reason why we do not include the European Union (EU) countries is that AD decisions in the
European Union are evaluated by the Trade Directorate of the European Commission which makes it
ambiguous to analyze which country’s ideology matters. In addition, as provided by Global AD
database (Bown, 2009), firms from different countries jointly file in most of the AD cases of the EU.
Furthermore, Indonesia is excluded from our sample because the ideologies of the political parties of
Indonesia are unspecified in the DPI database.
12
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currency and the periods of economic recession are associated with an increase in the
number of AD filings.
Moreover, increase in the democratization of the country is also associated
with higher number of AD petitions. This can be attributed to the higher expected
probability of wining an AD case because of better institutions in a democratic regime.
This result might also implicate that industries in democratic countries have easier
access to the government agencies which reduces their filing costs associated with an
AD petition. The positive sign of the coefficient on the WTO membership shows the
triggering effect of common set of AD rules on the industries’ AD initiations after the
1995 inception of WTO.
We now turn to the results of government’s decision to impose AD duty. In
Table 4, we report the case level AD decision estimates when each observation is
matched with its three-digit ISIC code. In line with the partisan trade policy, the
positive estimate of the ideology variable and the negative estimate of interaction term
demonstrate that an increase in the leftist bias of the government is associated with an
increase in the likelihood of an affirmative outcome for the industries operating at low
capital-labor ratio. This is also depicted in Figure 1 which shows the relationship
between the leftist orientation of the government and the probability of a successful
AD filing for different levels of the capital intensity of the industries. As shown, we
have a negatively sloped line and the negative marginal effect is obtained for the
capital-labor ratios above the critical one. (
In terms of control variables, we find that petitions from larger industries
which are more likely to be organized for lobbying are associated with a higher
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probability of a successful outcome. Consistent with the WTO’s requirements,
industries facing more competition from imports are more likely to grant AD
protection, as well as the industries experiencing a depression in production. Finally,
we do not find a significant effect of the macroeconomic determinants on the
probability of observing a successful AD case.

5. Conclusion
After the dramatic tariff-cuts global trade experienced in the last two decades,
countries still can find alternative ways for temporary protection. Out of these nonmethods, AD has become the most frequently used non-tariff barrier. Although an
ideal AD case aims to hinder unfair competition in the international market, it has
been widely argued that AD is also motivated by political economic considerations. To
our knowledge, this study is the first attempt to examine one dimension of these
political economic factors, the effect of political ideology of the governments on AD
activity. Matching the data on three-digit ISIC industries’ production and investment
with the detailed product level information on AD filings, we demonstrate that in the
periods of left wing governments, an increase in the labor intensity of the industry is
associated with an increase in the number of AD filings from that industry. In
addition, our results confirm the effect of political ideology on the governments’
decision to impose AD duty. The empirical results suggest that the probability of a
successful AD investigation increases in labor intensity of that industry when there is
a left-wing government in power. Our results are also robust to controlling for
country and industry fixed effects and also insensitive to controlling for several factors
which is pointed out in the existing literature.
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Table. 1. Summary Statistics ( Industry Estimation)
Variable
AD Initiation
Ideology
K/L (log)
Output share
Output growth§
Import growth§
GDP growth
Exchange rate
Current account*
WTO membership
Democracy
-

*

Mean
0.096
1.936
10.161
0.936
0.091
0.508
4.090
0.950
24.656
0.384
5.576

Max
1
3
16.629
13.228
4.820
180.498
12.822
69.458
40.371
1
7

Min
0
1
4.702
0.001
0.613
0.986
-11.7
0.151
-413.442
0
2

variable scaled down by 106
§
Average percentage change from three years before t.

Standard deviation
0.295
0.927
1.257
1.331
0.186
5.562
3.941
6.460
65.385
0.486
1.292

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics ( Case level)
Variable
AD affirmative
Ideology
K/L (log)
Output share
Output growth§
Import growth§
GDP growth
Exchange rate
Current account*
WTO membership
Democracy

-

*
§

Mean
0.596
1.711
11.102
1.598
0.047
0.080
3.307
0.092
-60.680
0.427
6.190

Max
1
3
13.157
12.357
1.908
4.033
9.486
1.638
40.371
1
7

variable scaled down by 106
Average percentage change from three years before t.

Min
0
1
8.276
0.022
-0.561
-0.507
-6.854
- 0.157
-413.442
0
3

Standard deviation
0.490
0.946
0.932
1.590
0.179
0.270
2.989
6.460
102.243
0.494
1.240

TABLE 3. ZERO INFLATED POISSON MODEL ESTIMATES OF
ANTIDUMPING FILINGS

Dependent variable: Number of AD filings by industry h in country i
Coefficient
Estimates

The role of ideology
Ideologyit
Ideologyit * (K/L)iht
(K/L)iht

2.276
(2.31)**
-0.201
(6.36)***
0.030
(3.67)***

Other Political determinants
Output share of the industry
Import growth of the industry
Output growth of the industry
WTO membership
Democracy

0.012
(5.61)***
0.034
(5.76)***
-0.094
(1.92)*
0.094
(5.12)***
0.075
(2.13)**

Macroeconomic factors
GDP growth
Exchange rate
Current Account
Country fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Observations

-0.044
(3.60)***
-0.191
(5.49)***
-0.000
(0.67)
Yes
Yes
3234

Notes: All specifications include a constant which is suppressed. Robust t
statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%.

TABLE 4. LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL ESTIMATES OF
ANTIDUMPING DUTY IMPOSITION DECISION

The role of ideology

Coefficient Estimates

Ideologyit

0.644
(3.86)***
-0.059
(2.12)**
0.203
(1.97)*

Ideologyit * (K/L)iht
(K/L)iht
Political determinants
Output share
Import growth
Output growth
WTO membership
Democracy

0.026
(2.12)**
0.230
(3.98)***
-0.262
(4.80)***
-0.076
(0.65)
0.034
(0.65)

Macroeconomic factors
GDP growth
Exchange rate
Current Account

Country fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Case fixed effects
Observations

-0.002
(1.32)
0.015
(1.89)
0.000
(0.23)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1195

Notes: All specifications include a constant which is suppressed. Robust
t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%.
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Figure 1. The effect of Ideology on Affirmative AD case
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Thick dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
Thin dashed line is a kernel density estimate of lnkap.

Note: The increase in ideology can be interpreted as an increase in the leftist bias of the
government.

TABLE A1. ANTIDUMPING USE OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE DATA SAMPLE

Country

Time period

Australia
Canada
Colombia
India
Korea
Mexico
Peru
Turkey
United States
Subtotal

1986-2001
1986-1990
1990-2000
1986-2001
1986-2001
1986-2000
1991-1996
1989-2000
1986-2001

Number of AD
investigations

Number of
affirmative
cases

412
85
33
261
61
184
49
72
573
1715

131
65
18
210
38
95
16
50
277
900

Share of
affirmative
cases in total
investigations
0.31
0.76
0.54
0.85
0.62
0.51
0.32
0.69
0.48
0.52

Year of implementation of
AD law
1906
1904
1990
1985
1963
1986
1991
1989
1916

Source: Global Antidumping Database, Bown (2009) and Zanardi (2004).
Note: The availability of investment data determines the sample size. For Colombia, Peru and Turkey the starting years are
the year of implementation of AD law.

